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This paper seeks to synthesize the many ways in which diverse religious and religiously-affiliated 
actors (RRAAs) have worked together to influence international law. This paper begins by 
presenting three ways in which RRAAs have been, and continue to be, involved in the 
formation of international law beyond litigation. Then, as an example of RRAA’s engagement 
and influence in international human rights litigation, this paper then explores three ways in 
which religious institutions and religiously-affiliated NGOs engage with the European Court 
of Human Rights (ECtHR). Although this paper benefits from existing scholarship, 
additional questions ripe for future exploration are presented.  
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This paper began with a desire, broadly speaking, to understand the ways 
in which religious and religiously-affiliated actors (RRAAs)1 collaborate to affect 
change in international law. Collaboration between RRAAs is, of course, not 
new,2 nor is it cabined to one particular political persuasion; Interreligious 
partnerships very often coalesce on all sides of contentious public debates.3 
Furthermore, the reality of intrareligious diversity, that is, diversity within religious 
traditions, makes it not uncommon for coreligionists to find themselves on 
different sides of a particular issue.4 At the same time, the identity of the partners 
in a collaboration impacts the degree of access to and influence5 on the formation 
of law.  
There are a number of reasons why analysis of the role of religious and 
religiously-motivated actors in international law is timely. The growing trend of 
secularism in Europe, differing national responses to increased religious diversity 
because of migration, and the evolution of religion-related jurisprudence in 
international courts like the European Court of Human Rights’ (ECtHR) are but 
three.6 The growing frequency of RRAAs based in one jurisdiction seeking to 
intervene in ECtHR litigation taking place in another and in favor of a state party, 
rather than an individual claimant, is another.  
Part II provides a brief overview of the ways RRAAs have influenced the 
development of international law outside of litigation. This part includes a brief 
discussion of religious influence over the potential origins of international law and 
the enshrinement of substantive protections for the freedom of religion, belief, 
and conscience, as well as manifestation. It also discusses instances where 
coalitions of religious and religiously motivated actors came together to shape the 
                                                     
1 This paper uses both religious and religiously affiliated actors to differentiate between religious 
individuals and institutions (churches, denominational bodies, etc.) (religious actors) and NGOs 
engaged in advocacy on issues related to religious freedom (religiously affiliated actors). As used 
here, these terms are also intended to cover states with established religious identities. Where the 
shorthand, RRAAs, would be confusing, this paper explicitly differentiates between the types.  
2 See infra notes 11-23 and accompanying text.  
3 See infra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.  
4 Indeed, such diversity poses a formidable challenge to those who argue that religious identity, 
because of its transnational nature, has the potential to rival the supremacy of the state. See 
generally Ran Hirschl & Ayelet Shachar, Competing Orders: the Challenge of Religion to Modern 
Constitutionalism, 85 U CHI. L. REV. 425 (2018). 
5 See infra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.  
6 See Matthias Koenig, The Governance of Religious Diversity at the European Court of Human Rights, in 
INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES TO GOVERNING ETHNIC DIVERSITY (JANE BOULDEN & WILL 
KYMLICKA, EDS., 2015).  
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development of particular issues, often with co-religionists on all sides. Neither 
normative or descriptive accounts of this relationship are uncontested, notably 
when it comes to answering questions of inspiration, aspiration, and foundation. 
Although engaging and important as background, those debates fall outside the 
scope of this paper and are therefore referenced without conclusive evaluation of 
the merits of any particular claim.7 Finally, this part concludes by briefly 
mentioning at least one way in which representatives from diverse religious 
traditions and communities are convened by the Council of Europe for dialogue 
and knowledge-sharing.  
Part III explores the ways in which RRAAs, specifically religious 
institutions and religiously-affiliated NGOs, seek to influence international 
human rights litigation. Specifically, this paper looks at the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR), the tribunal responsible for adjudicating claims brought 
under the European Convention. The Convention is one of many international 
human rights instruments that directly protect the freedom of religion and belief. 
Almost all of these instruments also include religion as a protected ground within 
a non-discrimination clause.8 Thus, this focused examination is a small glimpse at 
a much larger picture. 
Religion remains a dynamic and motivating force informing large and 
small interactions between individuals, institutions, and states across the globe. 
Dr. Mashood Baderin, chair of the Centre for African Studies at SOAS University 
of London, argues that if international law is to develop “a legal framework that 
emphasizes our common humanity and dignity,” international lawyers and 
scholars “can no longer afford to ignore the importance that religion plays for 
many individuals and many societies.”9 But recognizing importance need not 
come at the expense of recognizing challenges, nor does it preclude balancing an 
individual or group’s right to manifest religion with other pressing rights and 
concerns.10  
                                                     
7 That being said, the contours of the debate are themselves of historiographical interest for 
what some scholars see as at stake in the framing. See, e.g. IOANA CISMAS, RELIGIOUS ACTORS 
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 18 (2014) (explaining that two narratives have developed in 
scholarship describing the relationship between religion and international law: scholars who wish 
to “recuperate” the role of religion to forge legitimacy in international law and scholars who to 
maintain international law as a separate discipline).  
8 MALCOLM D. EVANS, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW IN EUROPE 3-4 (1997). 
9 See Mashood A. Baderin, Religion and International Law: Friend or Foe?, Euro. Hum. R. L. Rev. 
637, 658 (Oct. 2009) (quoting Janis and Evans).  
10 Cf. Article 9.2, European Convention on Human Rights. Ideally, limits on religious exercise 
are not imposed lightly, but after careful balancing of various interests, including (but not limited 
to) those of the religious actor, third parties, and the state. Particular attention should be paid to 
the protection of religious minorities, especially when limits are the product of animus. See S.A.S 
v. France, 48335/11 Grand Chamber ¶ 128 (Jan. 7, 2014) (“Although individual interests must on 
occasion be subordinated to those of a group, democracy does not simply mean that the views 
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II. RRAAs and the Formation of International Law 
 
 Religious and religiously-motivated actors influence the formation of 
international law in a number of ways. The first is through coalition-building, 
which has occurred since the founding of the modern human rights regime. The 
results of these collaborations can sometimes be traced in the drafts and final 
versions of international legal instruments. The second way in which RRAAs 
influence the formation of international law is through convenings of experts and 
representatives. This avenue is, in some instances, narrower because it is often by 
invitation only and yet broad in that it includes different departments with the 
Council of Europe.  
 
i. Formation of international law & substantive protections of religious freedom 
 
Scholars debate the extent to which the concept11 and contours of 
international law were influenced by certain religious traditions.12 For instance, 
Dr. Baderin highlights scholarly literature that points to early examples of 
interstate relations in the histories of various traditions, including Christianity, 
Hinduism, Islam, Judaism, and Jainism, to name a few.13 Dr. Karen Murphy, a 
consultant on human rights and humanitarian policy, traces different conceptions 
of religious freedom to a number of different religious and philosophical 
traditions.14 Murphy notes that, “although the concept of freedom of thought, 
conscience[,] and religion emerged in the early centuries, recognition of this 
freedom in domestic law and policy was a gradual process and the human right to 
religious freedom is a relatively recent invention, enshrined in human rights 
declarations and conventions that are less than, or little more than, 50 years in 
existence.”15 
Whatever influences RRAAs and traditions may have had on the 
development of international law, the adoption of the U.N.’s Universal Charter 
for Human Rights in 1945 was the “climax in the formal substantive secularization 
                                                     
of the majority must always prevail: a balance must be achieved which ensures the fair treatment 
of people from minorities and avoids any abuse of a dominant position.”). 
11 See Baderin, supra note 9, at 637 (Oct. 2009) (“Modern international law is generally perceived 
as a secular international legal system but the debate about its relationship with religion is an old 
and ongoing one.”).  
12 Id. at 640-641 (noting scholars who have identified early examples of interstate relations, 
precursors to international law, in the histories of various traditions, including Christianity, 
Hinduism, Islam, Judaism, and Jainism).  
13 Id. 
14 KAREN MURPHY, STATE SECURITY REGIMES AND THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF RELIGION 
AND BELIEF: CHANGES IN EUROPE SINCE 2001 14-16 (2013). 
15 Id. at 16.  
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and positivism of modern international law.”16 The freedom to have and manifest 
religious beliefs, along with freedom of thought and conscience, came under 
protection of international law as fundamental rights in Article 18 the U.N. 
Declaration of Human Rights.17 It was the first of three major international legal 
instruments to substantively protect freedom of religion. A year later, in 1949, a 
draft of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention) was completed. The draft 
included protection of the freedom of religious belief, practice, and teaching.18 
Drafters anticipated a supplementary agreement would develop and define certain 
standards, a task that would be given to the Council of Europe.19 However, the 
supplementary agreement approach was abandoned in favor of putting flesh on 
the bones sooner rather than later and drafters borrowed language from Article 
18 of the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights.20 The European Convention was 
signed in 195021 and came into force in 1953.22 Sixteen years later, the U.N. 
General Assembly adopted the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, which protects religious belief and expression in Article 18, and it went 
into force in 1976.23 
Article 9 of the European Convention will be the focus of Part II 
(although with the caveat that RRAAs are involved in ECtHR litigation that spans 
numerous articles). Article 9.1 protects the freedom of thought, conscience, and 
religion, including the right to change religion or belief, and freedom to 
“manifest” that religion or belief in “worship, teaching, practice, and observance,” 
                                                     
16 Baderin, supra note 9, at 641 (noting that none of the Charter’s provisions refer to religion as 
“a legal or normative source of international law, except for its provisions on prohibition of 
religious discrimination”).  
17 United Nations, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 18, G.A. Res. 217 A (adopted 
Dec. 10 1948), 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/UDHR/Documents/UDHR_Translations/eng.pdf. For a 
discussion of a precursor within the Covenant of the League of Nations, see MURPHY, supra 
note 14, at 17.  
18 EVANS, supra note 8, at 263.  
19 Id. at 264.  
20 Id. According to Professor Sir Malcolm Evans, professor of public international law at the 
University of Bristol, a number of countries lobbied for certain amendments. Turkey and 
Sweden did not want to upset existing national laws relating to religious institutions and 
foundations or membership of certain groups. Id. at 268. The U.K. sought to limit the extent to 
which laws could be used to limit the freedom to manifest religion or belief. Id. at 269.   
21 Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Rome, 
4.XI. 1950, https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf.  
22 Javier Martínez-Torrón, The European Court of Human Rights and Religion, in LAW AND 
RELIGION: CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES, VOL. 4 186 (RICHARD O’DAIR & ANDREW LEWIS, EDS. 
2001).  
23 United Nations, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI) 
(adopted Dec. 16, 1966), https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx.  
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either alone or in community. Article 19.2 limits the right to manifest one’s 
religion or belief when “prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic 
society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health 
or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedom of others.” Article 14 
also prohibits discrimination on the basis of religion, among other qualities. Thus, 
religion turned out not to be just “something that once had mattered,” but a 
substantive subject matter for rights in the late twentieth and early twenty-first 
centuries.24  
RRAAs—including states, religious institutions, and NGOs—were 
involved in the articulation of these fundamental rights in the early twentieth 
century and they remain active in shaping international law norms.25 Dr. Ioana 
Cismas, Senior Lecturer at the Center for Applied Human Rights at the University 
of York, documented this involvement in a portion of her 2014 book, Religious 
Actors in International Law. For example, Cismas points to collaboration between 
some Catholic states, the Holy See, and some Muslim states during the 1990s in 
preparation for and response to international conferences on women, gender, and 
reproduction.26 Later initiatives touching on gender, reproduction, and rights 
related to sexual orientation brought forth coalitions on both sides of the debate, 
a line that did not cut across, but through, religious traditions. On one side, 
NGOs, mostly based in the U.S., from the Catholic, Evangelical, and Mormon 
traditions found common ground with the Russian Orthodox Church, the Holy 
See, and some Muslim states in opposition to changes in the scope of rights.27 On 
the other, Catholics for Free Choice, Ecumenical Women (Anglican, Presbyterian, 
Lutheran, Methodist) partnered with secular NGOs and a few governments 
lobbied for progressive changes.28 But coalitions are not static; they can and 
sometimes do shift, depending on the issue.29  
 
ii. Experts and Representation 
 
Experts and NGOs continue to play a role in monitoring the status of 
human rights, including religious freedom, within individual states and regions. 
The Committee of Ministers is responsible for overseeing the enforcement of 
ECtHR decisions. The Department of the Execution of Judgments of the 
European Court of Human Rights “assists the Committee of Ministers in its 
function of supervision of the implementation of the Court’s judgments” and 
                                                     
24 Baderin, supra note 9, at 642.  
25 See generally EVANS, supra note 8 (detailing the influence of religious actors on the development 
of international legal instruments and institutions). 
26 See CISMAS, supra note 7, at 59-60.  
27 Id. at 59-60.  
28 Id. at 61.  
29 See id. at 62-64. 
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“provides support to the member States to achieve full, effective and prompt 
execution of judgments.30 In addition, since 2008, the Committee of Ministers has 
hosted annual exchanges on the interreligious dimension of intercultural dialogue, 
often foregrounding a particular issue.31 In 2017, for instance, the exchange 
centered on migrants and refugees included inter alia experts from the Council of 
Europe, diplomats from particular member states, as well as representatives from 
the Commission of the Bishops’ Conferences of the European Community 
(Catholic), the Church of England’s National Refugee Welcome Center, the 
European Buddhist Union, the Director of the Liaison Office of the Orthodox 
Church to the European Union, the theology department of l’Université de 
Strasbourg, and the Caucasus Muslims Board.32 
In contrast to litigation strategies discussed in Part II, the convening of 
experts and/or coalitions in the process of drafting legal instruments or discussing 
of a particular issue may involve discussion of multiple perspectives and nuances. 
These kinds of encounters also happen with varying degrees of formality and with 
potentially more options available in terms of outcomes. In other words, 
encounters outside of litigation (i.e. non-adversarial encounters) may provide 
opportunities for expanding possibilities. Of course, organizers may always face 
challenges to decisions about who is or is not, and who should be, in the room 
when decisions are made. And Dr. Ran Hirschl, professor of political science and 
law at the University of Toronto, and Dr. Ayelet Shachar, director of the Max 
Planck Institute for the Study of Religious and Ethnic Diversity, point to 
“transnational activism on behalf of religious causes,” including participation in 
regional and specialized international bodies, as potential rivals to the supremacy 
of the constitutional state.33 At the same time, the breadth of interests in the room 
could prove to be a mechanism that encourages the inclusion of diverse voices, 
                                                     
30 Council of Europe, Presentation of the Department: Department for the Execution of Judgments of the 
European Court of Human Rights, https://www.coe.int/en/web/execution/presentation-of-the-
department (last accessed June 2019). 
31 See Council of Europe, Council of Europe Exchanges on the Religious Dimension of Intercultural 
Dialogue, https://www.coe.int/en/web/cm/exchanges (last accessed June 2019).  
32 2017 Council of Europe Exchange on the Religious Dimension of Intercultural Dialogue, 
“Migrants and Refugees: Challenges and Opportunities – What Role for Religious and Non-
Religious Groups?,” 
https://search.coe.int/cm/pages/result_details.aspx?objectid=0900001680764eba (last accessed 
June 2019).  
33 Cf. Hirschl & Shachar, supra note 4, at 454 (explaining that “transnational activism on behalf 
of religious clauses . . . is also visible in the role played by international religious experts in 
constitutional drafting in the former Soviet bloc countries and in countries as diverse as Nepal, 
Thailand, or Iraq,” and also manifests itself in “interfaith advocacy efforts to promote religious 
freedom through specialized regional and international bodies”). Hirschl and Shachar argue 
these “transnational and boundless characteristics of religion,” which includes the mobilization 
of diasporic communities across borders, “presents a structural advantage vis-A-vis the 
territorially bounded constitutional state in the early twenty-first century.” Id.  
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rather than the advancement of a particular viewpoint through litigation, a 
comparatively more insulated channel.  
III. RRAAs at the ECtHR 
 
Although the role of NGOs at the ECtHR has been characterized as 
limited,34 there are several ways in which NGOs are active at the Court.35 Like 
other NGOS, religious institutions and religiously-affiliated NGOs may track 
human rights abuses to raise awareness of an issue in the first instance, and 
submit amicus curiae briefs on behalf of petitioners. They may also appear 
before the Court as claimants in limited circumstances.  
 
i. Religious institutions as claimants 
 
Religious institutions may submit applications to the ECtHR alleging Article 
9 infringements upon religious freedom, although Cismas points out that it is 
not at all clear that all religious organizations have always had this capacity.36 She 
explores, for instance, some of the intricacies of ECtHR jurisprudence that were 
not at all a given when it comes to dealing with state-sponsored religious entities 
since, by definition, ECtHR claimants must be non-state actors (i.e. NGOs, thus 
                                                     
34 HEIDI NICHOLS HADDAD, THE HIDDEN HANDS OF JUSTICE: NGOS, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND 
INTERNATIONAL COURTS 49 (2018). Cf. Christine Bakker & Luisa Vierucci, Introduction, in 
NGOS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: EFFICIENCY IN FLEXIBILITY? 8 (PIERRE-MARIE DUPUY & 
LUISA VIERUCCI, EDS. 2008) (explaining a 2002 study that found the frequency of engagement 
between NGOs and international tribunals as much less common than the engagement of 
NGOs with international governmental organizations). 
35 See Laura Van den Eynde, “The Multifaceted and Crucial Role Played by NGOs at the 
European Court of Human Rights, Strasbourg Observers Blog, August 4, 2014, 
https://strasbourgobservers.com/2014/08/04/the-multifaceted-and-crucial-role-played-by-
ngos-at-the-european-court-of-human-rights/; Luisa Vierucci, NGOs Before International Courts 
and Tribunals, in NGOS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: EFFICIENCY IN FLEXIBILITY? 157 (Pierre-
Marie Dupuy & Luisa Vierucci, eds. 2008) (explaining amicus briefs as aimed at offering 
technical expertise and subject matter competence to help shape jurisprudence); Lloyd Hitoshi 
Mayer, NGO Standing and Influence in Regional Human Rights Courts and Commissions, 36 BROOK. J. 
INT’L L. 911 (2010-2011). Third party NGOS may participate in the proceedings of the ECHR 
under Article 36(2) of the European Convention, which allows for written or oral comments 
from “any person concerned” when “the interest of proper administration of justice” invites 
such input. LOVEDAY HODSON, NGOS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE 
37 (2011).  
36 See CISMAS, supra note 7, at 87-88; Iona Cismas & Stacy Cammarano, Whose Right and Who’s 
Right: The US Supreme Court v. the European Court of Human Rights on Corporate Exercise of Religion, 34 
B.U. INT’L L. J. 1, 8-9 (2016) (explaining the ECtHR’s development on this question, beginning 
with a set of cases involving the Church of Scientology in the late 1960s-1970s).  
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creating some ambivalence around the status of state-sponsored churches37) and 
be the victims of a rights violation cognizable under the Convention.38  
The ECtHR was established in 1959, alongside the European Commission 
of Human Rights (ECHR). At the time, individuals and private groups, with 
agreement of applicable member states, would first file complaints with the 
ECHR alleging a violation of his/her/its rights and then the Commission could 
bring a case before the ECtHR “if it deemed the complaint admissible and 
irresolvable by friendly settlement.”39 After 1994, NGOs and individuals could 
go directly to the ECtHR after the Commission had issued a report and no 
referral was needed, although the Court could refuse to consider the complaint.40 
But the real change, according to Professor Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, professor of 
law at Notre Dame Law School, came in 1998 when Protocol 11 eliminated the 
Commission and “expanded the entities that had a right to bring a case before 
the [ECtHR]” by amending Article 34 (see former Article 25) so as not to require 
state recognition of the ECtHR’s competence as a threshold matter.41  
At the same time, efforts by individual applicants “seeking to represent the 
interests of a broader group or class have generally proven unsuccessful” in 
international human rights tribunals, including the European Court of Human 
Rights.42 According to Article 34, applicants must be victims of an alleged 
violation of one of the rights articulated in the European Convention.43 
However, as of 2014, NGOs may sometimes be permitted to represent the 
interests of parties who cannot represent themselves.44 
                                                     
37 Id. See, e.g. Holy Monasteries v. Greece, Application Nos. 13092/87 and 13984/88, Judgment of 9 
Dec. 1994 (rejecting Greece’s argument that a claim by monasteries of the Greek Orthodox 
Church was inadmissible because of the Church’s status as a state church and emphasizing the 
“non-participation in government powers” as key to admissibility). 
38 See CISMAS, supra note 7, at 90-93. 
39 Mayer, supra note 35, at 915. 
40 Id. at 916.  
41 Id. See also Council of Europe, Explanatory Report, ETS 155, Human Rights (Protocol No. 11), 
¶¶ 85-87, Nov. 11, 1998, 
https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId
=09000016800cb5e9 (last accessed June 2019).  
42 William J. Aceves, Actio Popularis – The Class Action in International Law, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 
353, 355 (2003).  
43 See Nina Vajic, Some Concluding Remarks on NGOs and the European Court of Human Rights, in 
CIVIL SOCIETY, INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND COMPLIANCE BODIES 94 (TULLIO TREVES ET. 
AL, EDS. 2005).  
44 See The Centre for Legal Resources On Behalf of Câmpeanu v. Romania App. No. 47878/08 (July 17, 
2014), the case in which the Court first granted an NGO standing as third-party to represent a 
young Roma person who had died under mysterious circumstances while in the custody of the 
state. This expansion comes at a time when member states within the Council of Europe have 
noted with concern a growing number of state-based restrictions on NGO activity. See 
Parliamentary Assembly Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, New Restrictions on 
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The capacity of religious institutions to bring claims on their own behalf 
recently became important in the case of Magyar Keresztény Mennonita Egyház and 
Others v. Hungary.45 In that case, religious communities in Hungary, including 
Mennonite and various Evangelical churches, member congregations of the 
European Union for Progressive Judaism, and Buddhist communities, 
challenged changes to a national law that, inter alia, gave preferential treatment 
to “incorporated churches,” a designation granted by Parliament that required 
proof of 100 years of international existence or 20 years of organized operation 
in Hungary and membership of at least 0.1 percent of the population.46 In 
finding a violation of Article 11 (freedom of association) “in light of Article 9,” 
the ECtHR determined that the withdrawal of benefits in this instances 
amounted to an encroachment “upon the neutrality and impartiality required of 
the State,” which acts as a limit upon its regulatory power.47 
 
ii. Impact of, and benefits to, third party intervenors  
 
If not participating directly as a claimant, RRAAs can shape ECtHR 
jurisprudence through intervening as a third party with the aim of providing 
perspective on the implications of a particular decision. Third party NGOS may 
participate in the proceedings of the ECtHR under Article 36(2) of the European 
Convention, which allows for written or oral comments from “any person 
concerned” when “the interest of proper administration of justice” invites such 
input.48 Scholars have documented at least two ways in which third party 
intervention can impact litigation: 1) NGOs can provide technical expertise to 
help complainants prepare for the adjudication; and 2) NGOs provide subject-
matter competence that can ultimately help shape jurisprudence.49 Although 
                                                     
NGO Activities in Council of Europe Member States, AS/Jur (2018) 24, http://website-
pace.net/documents/19838/4246196/20180523-RestrictionsActivitiesNGOs-
EN.pdf/4fe88e6b-8659-47d6-9f4a-836ae8bdea7b. See also Hungarian Civil Liberties Union, 14 
Hungarian NGOs Bring ECHR Case Against New Anti-Civil Society Bill, Civil Liberties Union for 
Europe Blog, Jan. 31, 2018, https://www.liberties.eu/en/news/fourteen-hungarian-ngos-have-
brought-an-action-before-the-ecthr/14186 (detailing case before ECHR challenging Hungary’s 
delay in adjudicating domestic case fighting country’s “foreign funding” act). 
45 70945/11, 23611/12, 26998/12, 41150/12, 41155/12, 41463/12, 41553/12, 54977/12, and 
56581/12 (April 8, 2014).  
46 Id. at ¶ 24. See also Renáta Uitz, ECHR Blog, Violation of Religious Rights in Hungary Judgment, 
Aug. 11, 2014, http://echrblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/violation-of-religion-rights-in-
hungary.html. 
47 See id at ¶ 111. 
48 HODSON, supra note 36, at 37.  
49 Luisa Vierucci, NGOs Before International Courts and Tribunals, in NGOS IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW: EFFICIENCY IN FLEXIBILITY? 157 (Pierre-Marie Dupuy & Luisa Vierucci, eds. 2008); 
Dinah Shelton, The Participation of Non-Governmental Organizations in International Judicial Proceedings, 
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relatively inexpensive, NGOs may not pursue intervention because it is difficult 
to control outcome, they may not find out about the case in sufficient time, or 
may think non-legal arguments will not be persuasive to judges.50 
As a general matter, in her analysis of sample cases, Dr. Loveday Hodson, 
associate professor at Leicester Law School, found little data to suggest that the 
“affected group” hypothesis (the more briefs filed, the more impact, thus the 
more likely to win) impacted the outcome of ECtHR litigation.51 Instead, she 
observes that the NGOs may submit briefs to the ECtHR with the impression it 
bolsters credibility, especially when coming from a coalition of experts, not 
because NGOs’ proximity to public opinion will sway public opinion.52 Still, 
involvement is higher in cases heard before the Grand Chamber.53  
But there may be other benefits. Professor Christopher McCrudden, 
professor of human rights and equality law at Queen’s University, Belfast, points 
out that NGOs seeking to influence international courts can benefit from the 
“cascade” effect of international jurisprudence—favorable developments in one 
tribunal may influence developments elsewhere, including in domestic courts.54 
In writing on what he calls the “transnational cultural wars,” he notes that 
sometimes this advocacy is not so much about making change but about stopping 
or reversing it. The intervention by a diverse coalition of third parties, including 
religiously affiliated NGOs and states, in response to Lautsi v. Italy55 is an example. 
In Lautsi I, the General Court determined that the display of crucifixes in 
Italian public school classrooms, the subject of a complaint by a secular parent, 
did amount to a violation of Article 9.56 A coalition of religious institutions and 
NGOs, along with a handful of states found common ground in protesting the 
decision. The coalition included Evangelical Christians from the U.S., the Russian 
Orthodox Church, and the Vatican, along with the Russian Federation, Armenia, 
                                                     
88 AMER. J. INT. L. 611 (1994). Some studies suggest that NGO involvement is quite low. Mayer 
found that the ECHR rendered 10,067 decisions on the merits between January 1, 2000-
December 31, 2009 and 394 of those decisions had direct NGO involvement. Mayer, supra note 
36, at 923. Loveday Hodson’s study involved 149 test cases decided in 2000 and only 32 
included direct involvement of an NGO and some involvement possibly identified in 19 others. 
There were 8 third party interventions and NGOs participated informally in 26 of the cases. 
HODSON, supra note 35, at 46.  
50 Id. at 55.  
51 Id. at 51.  
52 Id. See Marco Frigessi di Rattalma, NGOs Before the European Court of Human Rights: Beyond 
Amicus Curiae Participation? in CIVIL SOCIETY, INTERNATIONAL COURTS, AND COMPLIANCE 
BODIES (TULLIO TREVES ET AL, EDS. 2005). 
53 Id. at 62.  
54 Christopher McCrudden, Transnational Culture Wars, 13 INT’L J. CONST. L. 434, 442 (2015). For 
a discussion of the monetary costs of such advocacy and whether such engagement is “cheap,” 
see id. at 443 n.55 and accompanying text and HADDAD, supra note 34, at 82.  
55 30814/06 (March 11, 2009), Grand Chamber decision, March 18, 2011. 
56 Id. See also Hirschl & Shachar, supra note 4, at 452.  
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Bulgaria, Greece, Cyprus, Malta, Monaco, Romania, San Marino, and Lithuania.57 
In Lautsi II, the Grand Chamber reversed and held that the displays did not 
amount to a violation, relying on the doctrine of the margin of appreciation.58  
Coalitions of this kind raise questions about the future of religious 
freedom litigation and the scope and direction of its protections. Dr. Pasquale 
Annichino, fellow at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies at the 
European University Institute, argues that the reliance on states to “protect and 
defend religious majorities and their privileges” might carry risks, some political 
and others theological.59 McCrudden has noticed two trends in recent years: First, 
religiously-affiliated NGOs “based in one jurisdiction, and seeing themselves as 
primarily interested in issues within that jurisdiction, are nevertheless increasingly 
intervening in jurisdictions other than their own.”60 Second, there are more 
NGOs that see themselves as global in scope and interests, although located in 
one jurisdiction, and frequently adopt a vision of “constitutional and human rights 
that is universalist and cosmopolitan in orientation and this has the effect of 
encouraging a view that violations of rights in one country are as much the NGO’s 
business as violations in any other country.”61 As McCrudden notes, this trend, 
coupled with the benefits of the “cascade effect,” discussed above, transplants 
some of the dynamics of domestic disagreements about the scope of religious 
freedom claims, into an international context. These trends, coupled with the 
doctrine of the margin of appreciation, raise salient questions about which voices 
are most likely to shape the ever-evolving jurisprudence related to Article 9.  
 
iii. Religions within the margin of appreciation 
 
Scholars have observed that the ECtHR’s Article 9 jurisprudence is not 
well-developed because there have been few opportunities to rule in such cases, 
especially when compared to other articles,62 and because the few cases that were 
heard fell into specific areas such as prisoners’ rights and conscientious 
objectors.63 Still, Hirschl and Shachar note that the ECtHR has been one of “the 
main centers of transnational religious activism, evident in the areas of 
reproductive freedom, the right to die, denominational education, the wearing or 
                                                     
57 Id. at 452-453. 
58 See Lautsi I. See also Osmanoğlu and Kocabaş v. Switzerland, 29086/12 (Jan. 10, 2017) (finding no 
violation for imposition of fine on Muslim parents who refused to allow their pre-pubescent 
daughters to attend their school’s compulsory mixed swimming lessons).  
59 Pascale Annicchino, Winning the Battle by Losing the War: The Lautsi Case and the Holy Alliance 
between American Conservative Evangelicals, the Russian Orthodox Church and the Vatican to Reshape 
European Identity, 6 REL. & HUM. RTS. 213, 219 (2011); Hirschl and Shachar, supra note 4, at 452.  
60 McCrudden, supra note 54, at 442.  
61 Id.  
62 EVANS, supra note 8, at 281.  
63 Id. at 282.  
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banning) of religious attire, and exhibition of religious symbols in various 
settings.”64  
At the same time, the ECtHR has applied the doctrine of the margin of 
appreciation in high profile Article 9 cases such as S.A.S. v. France65 and Lautsi v. 
Italy II. The doctrine of the margin of appreciation gives broad deference to states 
in fulfilling their duties under the Convention.66 In S.A.S., a case challenging 
France’s ban on full face veils, the Court rested its decision to afford a wide 
margin of appreciation on the argument that the law protected a concept the state 
referred to as “living together.”67 As Tania Pagotto, PhD candidate at Università 
Ca’ Foscari Venezia, explains, there are two aspects to the Court’s justification of 
the “living together” rationale. The first is the perception of the importance of 
the “proposed benefits of people being able to communicate face to face, which 
is argued to be an essential aspect of verbal and non-verbal exchanges.68 The 
second is an understanding of face-to-face communication as “a minimal 
precondition for building mutual trust, for a peaceful cohabitation in society” and 
as “an essential ingredient for ethical behavior.”69 In Lautsi II, a case challenging 
the display of crucifixes in Italian state schools, the Grand Chamber relied on the 
margin of appreciation to overturn the decision of the Second Section of the 
Strasbourg court and found no violation had occurred.  
Dr. Asim Jusic, assistant professor of law at Kuwait Law School, considers 
the doctrine of the margin of appreciation “a result of the Court’s understandable 
preference for conflict aversion, a manifestation of the Court’s partially secondary 
and supervisory role in the face of pluralism of state interests, and the variety 
evident within states’ institutional and social backgrounds.”70 At the same time, 
Jusic argues that the Court’s use the margin of appreciation is strategic and “rarely 
balanced the interests of states and the rights of individuals.”71 Its application 
“varies within the status of states, and the social status and distance of religious 
                                                     
64 Hirschl & Shachar, supra note 4, at 451. For a discussion of the contours of this mobilization 
in contexts outside of Europe, see id.  
65 48335/11 Grand Chamber (Jan. 7, 2014) 
66 See Council of Europe, Judicial Professions/The Lisbon Network, Margin of Appreciation 
Doctrine,  https://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/lisbonnetwork/themis/echr/paper2_en.asp 
(undated). Note: The Lisbon Network was integrated into the European Commission for the 
Efficiency of Justice in January 2011.   
67 See also Dakir v. Belgium, 4619/12 (July 11, 2017); Belcacemi and Oussar v. Belgium, 37798/13, (July 
11, 2017) (finding that a Belgium law prohibiting clothing that covered the face, and, unlike the 
French law, could include a prison sentence, did not amount to a violation of Article 9).  
68 Tania Pagotto, The Living Together Argument in the European Court of Human Rights, Case-Law, 20 
STUDIA Z PRAWA WYZNANIOWEGO 9, 13 (2017).  
69 Id. at 14.  
70 Asim Jusic, Damned If It Doesn’t and Damned If It Does: The European Court’s Margin of Appreciation 
and the Mobilizations Around Religious Symbols, 39 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 561, 566 (2018).  
71 Id. at 565.  
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symbols from the mainstream social norms.”72 The result is that law can 
simultaneously become a way of “mobilizing loyalties”73 while deference to 
certain states and symbols can result in disincentives for “socially distant” groups 
to litigate.74 
If the cascade effect theory is correct,75 the repercussions from cases 
involving the margin of appreciation may influence religious freedom 
jurisprudence in other jurisdictions. Put differently: When RRAAs that may not 
enjoy close proximity to state power in their “home” jurisdictions76 side with 
states in ECtHR litigation and then use that litigation success to influence 
jurisprudence at home, important questions are raised. In light of the non-
litigation strategies discussed in Part II that have more dialogic aspects, this 
influence might seem even more out of step with democratic norms.  
IV. Conclusion 
 
 This paper highlights a number of ways in which RRAAs have been and 
continue to be engaged in the development of international law and in ECtHR 
jurisprudence related to religious freedom. It does so in snapshots, although 
connections between them are readily seen. Different strategies of cooperation 
between RRAAs (i.e. drafting of legal instruments, consultation of experts, 
litigation advocacy) produce different effects.  
Hirschl and Sachar contend that the transnational, boundless 
characteristics of religion and its demonstrated potential to create and perpetuate 
“us versus them” frameworks challenge liberal constitutional narratives.77 But 
Hirschl and Sachar’s analysis may not fully appreciate the effects of diversity within 
religious groups. For instance, theological disagreements often accompany policy 
disagreement, contributing to internal fracturing that could weaken the strength 
of the transnational connections they claim. At the same time, religious actors 
may find common ground not in theology but in policy goals, thereby 
                                                     
72 Id. at 567.  
73 Id. at 599.  
74 Id. at 606. However, Jusic’s conclusion, that parties should perhaps engage in self-censorship 
and refrain from litigation given the potentially adverse outcomes, id. at 613, is not one this 
author necessarily shares, although it highlights the potential role for alternative dispute 
resolution in some instances. See also generally McCrudden, supra note 54 (arguing for a 
marketplace of ideas approach); Laurence R. Helfer, Redesigning the European Court of Human 
Rights: Embeddedness as a Deep Structural Principle of the European Rights Regime, 19 EURO. J. INT. L. 
125, 130 (2008) (arguing provocatively for additional “embeddedness” of the ECtHR in national 
legal systems to bolster remedies).   
75 See supra note 54 and accompanying text.  
76 Contrast, for instance, with state-established or sponsored churches and other religious 
institutions.  
77 Hirschl & Sachar, supra note 4, at 454.  
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strengthening the potential for inter-religious collaboration. This reality leaves 
open the question: Who is the “us” and who is the “them”? Although Hirschl and 
Sachar acknowledge that some religious groups are not opposed to the “hallmarks 
of the current liberal constitutional-rights jurisprudence,”78 this slight nod gives 
too little attention to the fact that many RRAAs find at least some of their 
common ground in those very hallmarks.  
At the same time, Hirschl and Shachar’s analysis, along with concerns 
about the range of expert voices consulted and the cascade effect theory—
especially in instances where RRAAs side with states—raise important questions 
about the depth and direction of current and future influence of RRAAs on 
international and domestic legal regimes.  
                                                     
78 Id. at 426.  
